Iran: The ongoing debate
In an attempt to make transitioning back into posting articles here as smooth as possible, this first update is simply a collection of interesting articles regarding the strikingly public debate about a possible military strike on Iran.
Israeli policymakers are ignoring several of the potential longer-term aspects of a strike: the preparedness of Israel’s home front; the contours of an Israeli exit strategy; the impact on U.S.-Israel relations; the global diplomatic fallout; the stability of world energy markets; and the outcome within Iran itself.
As part of a larger package on the Iranian debate, Foreign Affairs recently posted an article titled ‘What Happens After Israel Attacks Iran.’ The author begins by reminding the reader of the Israeli strikes of 1981 and 2007 on Iraqi and Syrian nuclear reactors, which notably did not lead to a larger conflict. He quickly shifts attention to the main topic of his article: for all its preparedness for ‘the day after’ a military strike, Israel is not properly considering the longer-term effects of an attack. The arguments on each of the points alluded to in the quote above are cogent, historical references to past Israeli military action abound, and Mr. Eiran gives a nice insight into the minds of senior Israeli officials.
Al Jazeera (video)
The so-called ‘Iranian Threat’ is a narrative being constructed by the US media all by itself – with scant public support from the Obama administration.
Al Jazeera’s Listening Post takes a look at the misinformation being spread in America through the media’s oftentimes sensationalist conjecture on Iranian capabilities and intentions. The report draws damning parallels with media coverage leading up to the 2003 invasion of Iraq. Here’s one telling fact: 7 out of 10 Americans believe that Iran has a nuclear weapon.
Short of occupation, the world cannot eliminate Iran’s capacity to gain the bomb. It can only change its will to possess one. Just now that is more likely to come about through sanctions and diplomacy than war.
The author concedes that a nuclear-armed Iran is in no other nation’s interest and has the very real potential of setting off a a regional and perhaps multi-regional nuclear arms race. However, he argues, a strike against Iran’s nuclear facilities will only delay and not entirely prevent the Persian nation from acquiring a bomb. Indeed, while in the short term an air strike could set back Iran’s nuclear progress several years, more significant longer-term issues arise. The program would ‘figuratively and literally’ go underground and the nuclear ‘know-how’ of Iranian scientists would be unaffected. Additionally, a strike would further galvanize already-popular support for the nuclear program and could serve as a much-needed boost to the low popularity of Iranian leaders.
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